Triton Inference Server 安全

import requests
from typing import Dict, List, Any, Optional
 
class TritonSecurityScanner:
    """Scan a Triton Inference Server for 安全 misconfigurations."""
 
    def __init__(self, http_url: str, metrics_url: Optional[str] = None):
        self.http_url = http_url.rstrip("/")
        self.metrics_url = metrics_url or f"{self.http_url.replace(':8000', ':8002')}"
 
    def check_server_health(self) -> Dict[str, Any]:
        """Check if the server is accessible and get basic info."""
        endpoints = {
            "health_live": f"{self.http_url}/v2/health/live",
            "health_ready": f"{self.http_url}/v2/health/ready",
            "metadata": f"{self.http_url}/v2",
        }
 
        results = {}
        for name, url in endpoints.items():
            try:
                resp = requests.get(url, timeout=5)
                results[name] = {
                    "accessible": True,
                    "status_code": resp.status_code,
                    "body": resp.json() if resp.headers.get("content-type", "").startswith("application/json") else resp.text[:200],
                }
            except requests.RequestException as e:
                results[name] = {"accessible": False, "error": str(e)}
 
        return results
 
    def enumerate_models(self) -> List[Dict]:
        """List all models loaded in Triton."""
        try:
            resp = requests.get(
                f"{self.http_url}/v2/models", timeout=10,
            )
            if resp.status_code == 200:
                models = resp.json().get("models", [])
                return models
        except requests.RequestException:
            pass
 
        # Fallback: try the repository index endpoint
        try:
            resp = requests.post(
                f"{self.http_url}/v2/repository/index",
                json={"ready": True},
                timeout=10,
            )
            if resp.status_code == 200:
                return resp.json()
        except requests.RequestException:
            pass
 
        return []
 
    def check_model_control(self) -> Dict[str, Any]:
        """Check if model loading/unloading is enabled (critical 安全 risk)."""
        try:
            # Try to get repository index — this requires model control to be enabled
            resp = requests.post(
                f"{self.http_url}/v2/repository/index",
                json={},
                timeout=10,
            )
            model_control_enabled = resp.status_code == 200
        except requests.RequestException:
            model_control_enabled = False
 
        return {
            "model_control_enabled": model_control_enabled,
            "severity": "high" if model_control_enabled else "info",
            "finding": (
                "Model control API is enabled — 攻擊者 can load/unload models"
                if model_control_enabled
                else "Model control API is disabled or restricted"
            ),
        }
 
    def check_metrics_exposure(self) -> Dict[str, Any]:
        """Check if Prometheus metrics are exposed."""
        try:
            resp = requests.get(f"{self.metrics_url}/metrics", timeout=5)
            if resp.status_code == 200:
                # Parse metrics for sensitive information
                metrics_text = resp.text
                model_names = set()
                for line in metrics_text.split("\n"):
                    if "model=" in line:
                        # Extract model name from metrics label
                        start = line.find('model="') + 7
                        end = line.find('"', start)
                        if start > 6 and end > start:
                            model_names.add(line[start:end])
 
                return {
                    "exposed": True,
                    "severity": "medium",
                    "model_names_leaked": list(model_names),
                    "metrics_size_bytes": len(metrics_text),
                    "finding": "Prometheus metrics endpoint is publicly accessible",
                }
        except requests.RequestException:
            pass
 
        return {"exposed": False, "severity": "info"}
 
    def check_inference_api(self, model_name: str) -> Dict[str, Any]:
        """Check if 推論 can be performed without 認證."""
        try:
            # Get model metadata to 理解 輸入 format
            resp = requests.get(
                f"{self.http_url}/v2/models/{model_name}",
                timeout=5,
            )
            if resp.status_code == 200:
                metadata = resp.json()
                return {
                    "accessible": True,
                    "model": model_name,
                    "metadata": metadata,
                    "severity": "high",
                    "finding": f"Model '{model_name}' is accessible without 認證",
                }
        except requests.RequestException:
            pass
 
        return {"accessible": False}
 
    def full_scan(self) -> Dict[str, Any]:
        """Run a comprehensive 安全 scan."""
        results = {
            "target": self.http_url,
            "server_health": self.check_server_health(),
            "model_control": self.check_model_control(),
            "metrics": self.check_metrics_exposure(),
            "models": [],
        }
 
        models = self.enumerate_models()
        for model in models[:10]:  # Limit to first 10
            model_name = model.get("name", model) if isinstance(model, dict) else str(model)
            results["models"].append(self.check_inference_api(model_name))
 
        return results

# Starting Triton with explicit model control — allows API-driven model loading
docker run --gpus all -p 8000:8000 -p 8001:8001 -p 8002:8002 \
  -v /models:/models \
  nvcr.io/nvidia/tritonserver:24.01-py3 \
  tritonserver \
    --model-repository=/models \
    --model-control-mode=explicit
 
# 攻擊者 can now load a malicious model via the API:
# curl -X POST http://target:8000/v2/repository/models/malicious_model/load

import os
import shutil
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Dict
 
class ModelRepositoryAuditor:
    """Audit the 安全 of a Triton model repository."""
 
    def __init__(self, repo_path: str):
        self.repo_path = Path(repo_path)
 
    def audit_permissions(self) -> list:
        """Check file 權限 on model repository."""
        findings = []
 
        # Check repository root 權限
        repo_stat = os.stat(self.repo_path)
        if repo_stat.st_mode & 0o002:  # World-writable
            findings.append({
                "severity": "critical",
                "finding": "Model repository root is world-writable",
                "path": str(self.repo_path),
                "remediation": "Set 權限 to 750 or more restrictive",
            })
 
        # Check each model directory
        for model_dir in self.repo_path.iterdir():
            if not model_dir.is_dir():
                continue
 
            # Check config.pbtxt
            config_path = model_dir / "config.pbtxt"
            if config_path.exists():
                config_stat = os.stat(config_path)
                if config_stat.st_mode & 0o002:
                    findings.append({
                        "severity": "high",
                        "finding": f"Model config is world-writable: {model_dir.name}",
                        "path": str(config_path),
                    })
 
            # Check model files in version directories
            for version_dir in model_dir.iterdir():
                if version_dir.is_dir() and version_dir.name.isdigit():
                    for model_file in version_dir.iterdir():
                        file_stat = os.stat(model_file)
                        if file_stat.st_mode & 0o002:
                            findings.append({
                                "severity": "critical",
                                "finding": f"Model file is world-writable: {model_file.name}",
                                "path": str(model_file),
                                "model": model_dir.name,
                                "version": version_dir.name,
                            })
 
        return findings
 
    def verify_model_integrity(self, expected_hashes: Dict[str, str]) -> list:
        """Verify model files against expected SHA-256 hashes."""
        import hashlib
        findings = []
 
        for model_path_str, expected_hash in expected_hashes.items():
            model_path = self.repo_path / model_path_str
            if not model_path.exists():
                findings.append({
                    "severity": "high",
                    "finding": f"Expected model file missing: {model_path_str}",
                })
                continue
 
            sha256 = hashlib.sha256()
            with open(model_path, "rb") as f:
                for chunk in iter(lambda: f.read(8192), b""):
                    sha256.update(chunk)
 
            actual_hash = sha256.hexdigest()
            if actual_hash != expected_hash:
                findings.append({
                    "severity": "critical",
                    "finding": f"Model file hash mismatch: {model_path_str}",
                    "expected": expected_hash,
                    "actual": actual_hash,
                    "detail": "Model file may have been replaced with a poisoned version",
                })
            else:
                findings.append({
                    "severity": "info",
                    "finding": f"Model file integrity verified: {model_path_str}",
                })
 
        return findings
 
    def check_for_pickle_models(self) -> list:
        """Check for models using pickle serialization (deserialization risk)."""
        findings = []
 
        for model_dir in self.repo_path.iterdir():
            if not model_dir.is_dir():
                continue
 
            config_path = model_dir / "config.pbtxt"
            if config_path.exists():
                config_text = config_path.read_text()
                if "pytorch" in config_text.lower() or "python" in config_text.lower():
                    # PyTorch models may use pickle serialization
                    for version_dir in model_dir.iterdir():
                        if version_dir.is_dir() and version_dir.name.isdigit():
                            for f in version_dir.iterdir():
                                if f.suffix in (".pt", ".pth", ".pkl", ".pickle"):
                                    findings.append({
                                        "severity": "high",
                                        "finding": f"Model uses pickle serialization: {f.name}",
                                        "model": model_dir.name,
                                        "detail": "Pickle deserialization can execute arbitrary code. "
                                                 "考慮 converting to ONNX or TensorRT format.",
                                    })
 
        return findings

#!/bin/bash
# Deploy Triton with Envoy sidecar for 認證 and TLS
 
# Generate self-signed cert for demonstration (use proper CA in production)
openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:4096 -keyout /etc/ssl/triton.key \
  -out /etc/ssl/triton.crt -days 365 -nodes \
  -subj "/CN=triton.internal"

# Kubernetes deployment with Istio sidecar for mTLS and auth
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
  name: triton-推論-server
  namespace: ml-serving
spec:
  replicas: 2
  selector:
    matchLabels:
      app: triton
  template:
    metadata:
      labels:
        app: triton
      annotations:
        sidecar.istio.io/inject: "true"
    spec:
      containers:
      - name: triton
        image: nvcr.io/nvidia/tritonserver:24.01-py3
        args:
        - tritonserver
        - --model-repository=/models
        - --model-control-mode=none  # Disable runtime model changes
        - --strict-model-config=true
        - --rate-limit=execution_count
        - --rate-limit-resource=R1:5:0  # Limit to 5 concurrent on GPU 0
        ports:
        - containerPort: 8000
          name: http
        - containerPort: 8001
          name: grpc
        # Do NOT expose metrics port externally
        resources:
          limits:
            nvidia.com/gpu: 1
            memory: "16Gi"
          requests:
            memory: "8Gi"
        volumeMounts:
        - name: models
          mountPath: /models
          readOnly: true  # Model repository should be read-only
        securityContext:
          runAsNonRoot: true
          runAsUser: 1000
          readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
          allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
          capabilities:
            drop:
              - ALL
      volumes:
      - name: models
        persistentVolumeClaim:
          claimName: model-repo-pvc
          readOnly: true

import numpy as np
from typing import Dict, Any, Optional
 
class TritonInputValidator:
    """Validate 推論 inputs before sending to Triton."""
 
    def __init__(self, model_config: Dict[str, Any]):
        self.inputs = model_config.get("輸入", [])
        self.max_input_size_bytes = 10 * 1024 * 1024  # 10 MB default limit
 
    def validate_request(self, request_data: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
        """Validate an 推論 request."""
        errors = []
 
        inputs = request_data.get("inputs", [])
 
        # Check total request size
        total_size = 0
        for inp in inputs:
            data = inp.get("data", [])
            if isinstance(data, (list, np.ndarray)):
                total_size += np.array(data).nbytes
 
        if total_size > self.max_input_size_bytes:
            errors.append(
                f"Request too large: {total_size} bytes exceeds limit of "
                f"{self.max_input_size_bytes} bytes"
            )
 
        # Validate each 輸入
        for inp in inputs:
            name = inp.get("name", "")
            shape = inp.get("shape", [])
            datatype = inp.get("datatype", "")
 
            # Check for unreasonable shapes (DoS prevention)
            if any(dim > 10000 for dim in shape):
                errors.append(
                    f"輸入 '{name}' has unreasonable dimension: {shape}"
                )
 
            # Check for negative dimensions
            if any(dim < 0 for dim in shape):
                errors.append(
                    f"輸入 '{name}' has negative dimension: {shape}"
                )
 
            # Validate data values for known 輸入 types
            data = inp.get("data")
            if data is not None and datatype.startswith("FP"):
                arr = np.array(data, dtype=np.float32)
                if np.any(np.isnan(arr)) or np.any(np.isinf(arr)):
                    errors.append(
                        f"輸入 '{name}' contains NaN or Inf values"
                    )
 
        return {
            "valid": len(errors) == 0,
            "errors": errors,
        }

import time
from collections import defaultdict
from typing import Dict, Optional
 
class TritonRateLimiter:
    """Rate limiting for Triton 推論 endpoints."""
 
    def __init__(
        self,
        requests_per_second: int = 100,
        burst_limit: int = 200,
        per_model_limit: Optional[int] = None,
    ):
        self.rps = requests_per_second
        self.burst = burst_limit
        self.per_model_limit = per_model_limit or requests_per_second
        self._client_tokens: Dict[str, float] = defaultdict(lambda: float(self.burst))
        self._client_last_check: Dict[str, float] = defaultdict(time.time)
        self._model_counts: Dict[str, int] = defaultdict(int)
        self._model_window_start: float = time.time()
 
    def allow_request(self, client_id: str, model_name: str) -> bool:
        """Check if a request should be allowed (符元 bucket algorithm)."""
        now = time.time()
 
        # Replenish 符元
        elapsed = now - self._client_last_check[client_id]
        self._client_tokens[client_id] = min(
            self.burst,
            self._client_tokens[client_id] + elapsed * self.rps,
        )
        self._client_last_check[client_id] = now
 
        # Check per-client rate limit
        if self._client_tokens[client_id] < 1:
            return False
 
        # Check per-model rate limit (reset window every second)
        if now - self._model_window_start > 1.0:
            self._model_counts.clear()
            self._model_window_start = now
 
        if self._model_counts[model_name] >= self.per_model_limit:
            return False
 
        # Consume 符元
        self._client_tokens[client_id] -= 1
        self._model_counts[model_name] += 1
        return True

from typing import Dict, List
 
class TritonSecurityMonitor:
    """Monitor Triton metrics for 安全-relevant anomalies."""
 
    def __init__(self, prometheus_url: str):
        self.prom_url = prometheus_url
 
    def check_anomalies(self, metrics_text: str) -> List[Dict]:
        """Parse Prometheus metrics and flag anomalies."""
        alerts = []
 
        # Parse metrics into dict
        metrics = {}
        for line in metrics_text.split("\n"):
            if line.startswith("#") or not line.strip():
                continue
            parts = line.split(" ")
            if len(parts) >= 2:
                metrics[parts[0]] = float(parts[1])
 
        # Check for unusually high error rates
        for key, value in metrics.items():
            if "error" in key.lower() and value > 100:
                alerts.append({
                    "alert": "high_error_rate",
                    "metric": key,
                    "value": value,
                    "detail": "High error rate may indicate fuzzing or malformed 輸入 attacks",
                })
 
            # Check for models being loaded/unloaded (possible model swap attack)
            if "model_load" in key.lower() and value > 0:
                alerts.append({
                    "alert": "model_loaded",
                    "metric": key,
                    "value": value,
                    "detail": "Model was loaded at runtime — verify this was authorized",
                })
 
        return alerts